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LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
Another advantage of a precisely worded set of guidelines would be
that they would take the focus of the courts away from the fitness of the
parties and place it where it should be, on the best interest of the child.
This would also prevent the petitioning parent from being forced to
prove the other's unfitness. Louisiana courts should also follow the lead
taken by other courts in further employing the services of experts in the
field of human behavior in order to determine more realistically what is
in fact the child's best interest. 6
7
Furthermore, the guidelines would resolve the bickering 68 between
the circuits involving the application of the maternal preference and the
double burden rules. Although the conflict may simply be a matter of
semantics, as one judge has suggested,69 its final determination would
permit the courts to deal more completely with each individual child's
best interest, with no need to take sides in a controversy over jurispru-
dential interpretation.
Decisions concerning child custody are perhaps the most difficult
that a judge must make.70 However, the job should not be made easier
by mechanically applied formulas which sacrifice the best interest of the
child to judicial economy. With so much at stake, the courts can ill
afford to make decisions based on out-of-date presumptions and inflexi-
ble rules.
Samuel N Poole, Jr.
HOME RULE AND LOCAL ORDINANCES DEFINING GAMBLING
Defendant was convicted in Shreveport city court of violating a mu-
67. "[I]t seems clear that the trend particularly among the more enlightened courts is to
ignore the rigid absolutes and legalisms of the past and adhere with increasing frequency to
the trend toward reliance on the social scientists and expert testimony of psychologists,
psychiatrists, social investigators and other experts in the field of human behavior."
Podell, Peck & First, Custody-To Which Parent, 56 MARQ. L. REV. 51, 68 (1972).
68. There are no signs that the circuits are coming closer to an agreement concerning
the use of the double burden rule. In fact, the very opposite seems to be the state of affairs
at this time. See Languirand v. Languirand, 350 So. 2d 973 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1977).
69. Bushnell v. Bushnell, 348 So. 2d at 1322 (Domengeaux, J., dissenting).
70. "[A] judge agonizes more about reaching the right result in a contested custody
issue than about any other type of decision he renders." B. BOTEIN, TRIAL JUDGE 273
(1952).
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nicipal gambling ordinance' enacted under the authority of the city's
home rule charter. 2 Unlike the state gambling statute, Criminal Code
article 90,3 which defines "gambling" to include only certain conduct
when conducted "as a business," the Shreveport ordinance defined
"gambling" to include certain social activities which would not be classi-
fied as a business. Defendant appealed to the district court, which re-
versed the conviction and held the ordinance unconstitutional. Upon
the city's direct appeal,4 the Louisiana Supreme Court affirmed the dis-
trict court's judgment and held the ordinance unconstitutional under ar-
ticle XII, section 6 of the Louisiana Constitution, which the court
interpreted as giving the legislature sole authority to define gambling.
5
City of Shreveport v. Kaufman, 353 So. 2d 995 (La. 1977).
Traditionally, municipal corporations were viewed as being mere
"creatures of the state" which could exercise only such powers as the
legislature bestowed upon them.6 Under this view, municipalities had
little or no local autonomy to deal with increasingly complex and diverse
problems, often forcing them to seek enabling legislation to carry out
necessary functions not previously authorized by the legislature. The
concept of "home rule" developed in response to this problem: its objec-
tive is to give municipalities more freedom of action to deal with local
problems by delegating broad authority to the home rule unit in a consti-
tutional or legislative grant of power.7 However, the increased powers of
home rule units do not amount to complete autonomy, since no such
powers can be inconsistent with general laws or the constitution. 8
1. SHREVEPORT, LA., ORDINANCES ch. 21, art. I, §§ 21-30.
2. SHREVEPORT CITY CHARTER § 2.04 provides the following:
In addition to the powers granted by other sections of this plan of government, the city
shall have power: .... (d) To make all necessary regulations for the prevention and
prohibition of gaming for money or property, by any method or device ....
3. LA. R.S. 14:90 (1950): "Gambling is the intentional conducting, or directly assisting
the conducting, as a business, of any game, contest, lottery, or contrivance whereby a per-
son risks the loss of anything of value in order to realize a profit." (Emphasis added).
4. LA. CONST. art. V, § 5(D)(1) provides for a direct appeal to the Supreme Court from
a district court if "a law or ordinance has been declared unconstitutional."
5. LA. CONST. art. XII, § 6: "Neither the state nor any of its political subdivisions shall
conduct a lottery. Gambling shall be defined by and suppressed by the legislature."
6. This concept is often referred to as "Dillon's Rule," based upon an opinion written
by Judge John F. Dillon of the Iowa Supreme Court in 1868. In City of Clinton v. Cedar
Rapids and Missouri River A.R, 24 Iowa 455 (1868), Judge Dillon noted: "Municipal cor-
porations owe their origin to, and derive their powers ... from, the legislature .... They
are, so to phrase it, the mere tenants at will of the legislature." Id. at 475 (emphasis in
original).
7. See J. FORDHAM, LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW 70-71 (rev. ed. 1975).
8. "Any municipal control or prescribing of offenses must conform to, and not conflict
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The Louisiana Constitution of 1921 provided that the constitution
and the general laws of this state were paramount and that any at-
tempted exercise of power by a municipality, home rule or otherwise,
could not be inconsistent or in conflict therewith.9 It also established a
grant for home rule in New Orleans,10 and mandated the legislature to
provide procedures whereby other municipalities could frame home rule
charters.'" Other specific grants for home rule were periodically estab-
lished by constitutional amendment. The City of Shreveport was
granted authority to adopt a home rule charter by a 1948 amendment,' 2
and the Shreveport City Charter was adopted and became effective on
November 14, 1950. Thus, after that date, Shreveport exercised home
rule local autonomy subject to the restrictions of article XIV, section
40(d) of the constitution of 1921.
Prior to the constitution of 1974, the Louisiana courts adopted a
"strict constructionist" approach to the consistency requirement and
often struck down municipal ordinances for being in conflict with gen-
eral laws, even though the matters involved appeared local in nature.13
This restriction of home rule was contrary to its original objectives. Ac-
with, the constitution, statutes and public policy of the state. This is, of course, a corollary
of the cardinal requisite governing an ordinance that it must conform to the state constitu-
tion, statutes, and public policy in order to be valid." 6 E. MCQUILL1N, THE LAW OF
MUNICIPAL COPORATIONS § 23.07 (rev. ed. 1969).
9. La. Const. art. XIV, § 40(d) (1921): "The provisions of this constitution and of any
general laws passed by the legislature shall be paramount and no municipality shall exer-
cise any power or authority which is inconsistent and in conflict therewith. Subject to the
foregoing restrictions every municipality shall have, in addition to the powers expressly
conferred upon it, the additional right and authority to adopt and enforce local police,
sanitary and similar regulations, and to do and perform all other acts pertaining to its local
affairs, property and government which are necessary or proper in the legitimate exercise of
its corporate powers and municipal functions."
10. La. Const. art. XIV, § 22 (1921).
11. La. Const. art. XIV, § 40(c) (1921).
12. La. Const. art. XIV, § 37 (1921), proposedby 1948 La. Acts, No. 529. The others
were the City of Baton Rouge [art. XIV, § 3(a), proposed by 1946 La. Acts, No. 319], Jeffer-
son Parish [art. XIV, § 3(c), proposed by 1956 La. Acts, No. 631], and Saint Bernard Parish
[art. XIV, § 3(e), proposedby 1966 La. Acts, No. 573]. In addition, sections 3(d) and 3(g)
provided for further procedures for the framing of other new home rule charters.
13. See Bradford v. City of Shreveport, 305 So. 2d 487 (La. 1974), in which Shreve-
port was held to have no authority "to regulate overtime pay for policemen to the exclusion
of state law." The Bradford case is no longer the law under the constitution of 1974, since
pay for policemen and firemen has been held to be a matter of local "structure and organi-
zation" [Letellier v. Parish of Jefferson, 254 La. 1067, 229 So. 2d 101 (1969); La Fleur v.
City of Baton Rouge, 124 So. 2d 374 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1960)], which is strictly a local
concern for any local governmental subdivision operating under a home rule charter,
under article VI, § 6, and is thus within the authority of Shreveport's home rule charter.
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cording to one delegate to the Constitutional Convention of 1973, it was
the "designed purpose" of the drafters of article VI of the 1974 constitu-
tion to remedy this problem of legislative dominance. 14
Article VI replaced the intricate detail of article XIV of the constitu-
tion of 1921.15 It allows home rule units existing at the time of the
adoption of the 1974 constitution to retain the powers they had under the
1921 constitution, except for those inconsistent with the 1974 constitu-
tion.16 Such units are also allowed to exercise any powers which are
granted to non-home rule subdivisions, if their home rule charters per-
mit. 17 The powers granted to non-home rule units include those which
are "necessary, requisite, or proper" to the management of the unit's lo-
cal affairs, provided that such new powers are approved by the electorate
of the individual unit, and are not denied by the unit's charter or by
general law.' 8 Thus, article VI replaced the "strict constructionist" the-
ory and the principle of legislative dominance with a broad theory of
local governmental power.19 However, article VI cannot be said to have
gone so far as to "create separate city-states," inasmuch as the exercise of
local governmental substantive powers must be consistent with the con-
stitution and is subject to legislative control through general laws.20
This balance between state and local governmental authority was an ob-
jective sought by the drafters of article VI.2 1
In the instant case, the supreme court recognized the broad change
in philosophy concerning local governmental powers under article VI
and the grant of broad residual powers to local governmental subdivi-
sions.22 However, in holding the Shreveport ordinance unconstitu-
tional, the court emphasized the requirement of consistency with the
14. Kean, Local Government and Home Rule, 21 Loy. L. REV. 63, 66 (1975).
15. See City of Shreveport v. Kaufman, 353 So. 2d 995, 996 (La. 1977).
16. La. Const. art. VI, § 4: "Every home rule charter or plan of government existing or
adopted when this constitution is adopted shall remain in effect and may be amended,
modified, or repealed as provided therein. Except as inconsistent with this constitution,
each local governmental subdivision which has adopted such a home rule charter or plan
of government shall retain the powers, functions, and duties in effect when this constitution
is adopted. If its charter permits, each of them also shall have the right to powers and
functions granted to other local governmental subdivisions."
17. Id.
18. LA. CONST. art. VI, § 7(A).
19. Kean, supra note 14, at 66: "The old strict constructionist theory is. . . replaced by
one which recognizes that so long as the Legislature does not deny a power, local govern-
ment possesses it, thereby rendering any further enabling legislation unnecessary."
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. 353 So. 2d at 996-97.
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constitution. The court interpreted article XII, section 6 as empowering
the legislature alone to define gambling, and concluded that any attempt
by a local governmental unit to prohibit conduct which is not prohibited
by the legislature's definition of gambling is inconsistent with that arti-
cle's grant of authority.2 3 A local governmental subdivision may, how-
ever, punish the offense of gambling as defined by the legislature in
Criminal Code article 90.24
In a dissenting opinion, 25 Chief Justice Sanders objected to the
court's reliance upon article XII, section 6 as the source of the ordi-
nance's inconsistency with the constitution since he felt that the article is
merely an editorial revision of article XIX, section 8 of the 1921 constitu-
tion, "which admittedly did not bar municipal definition and suppres-
sion of gambling."'26  The Chief Justice also read the language in the
debates of the Constitutional Convention of 1973 to indicate that the
new provision was not intended to change the municipal power to define
and regulate gambling. 27  He would thus have upheld the ordinance in
the instant case. 28
Although Shreveport is a home rule municipality, the language used
by the majority in pronouncing its decision refers not just to home rule
subdivisions, but to local governments generally. The effect of this deci-
23. Id. at 997.
24. Id
25. Id. at 998.
26. Id. Article XIX, section 8 of the 1921 constitution provided that "[glambling is a
vice and the Legislature shall pass laws to suppress it." LA. R.S. 33:4851.1 (Supp. 1952)
allowed certain municipalities to define gambling but not others. See the text of this sec-
tion in note 29, infra. City of New Orleans v. Stone, 221 La. 133, 58 So. 2d 736 (1952),
discussed at notes 38-42 infra, allowed New Orleans to define gambling differently from
LA. R.S. 14:90. The Stone case was limited to New Orleans, however, and the cities of
Shreveport and Baton Rouge were excluded from LA. R.S. 33:4851.1 since those cities have
a population of over 100,000. Thus, Shreveport and Baton Rouge appear to have been the
only municipalities in Louisiana prior to the 1974 constitution which were not authorized
to define gambling in a local ordinance. However, it is unclear whether the reasoning for
the exclusions is based upon inconsistency with article XIX, section 8, or upon the require-
ment of consistency with general law.
27. Chief Justice Sanders reasoned that, since the "general thrust" of the 1974 constitu-
tion was to strengthen municipal home rule, the delegates would have used specific lan-
guage if they had "intended to divest municipalities of substantial powers." 353 So. 2d at
999. However, it appears that the city of Shreveport did not have the power to define
gambling prior to the 1974 constitution and thus could not be said to have been "divested"
of such power therein. See note 26, supra.
28. 353 So. 2d at 999. Again, however, this conclusion is based upon the assumption
that Shreveport had the power to define gambling prior to the 1974 constitution, which
appears not to have been the case. See note 26, supra.
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sion is to preclude all local governmental subdivisions in Louisiana from
defining gambling differently from the legislature's definition in Crimi-
nal Code article 90. Before this decision, all municipalities in the state
with populations of one hundred thousand or less were empowered by
statute to define gambling in any way they saw fit. 29 The instant case
effectively renders that statute unconstitutional.
30
In its analysis, the majority assumed that no general law would pro-
hibit Shreveport from enacting the ordinance in question and addressed
the problem in terms of inconsistency with the constitution. However,
at least in regard to the Shreveport ordinance itself, the majority could
have reached the same result through an analysis of Louisiana jurispru-
dence concerning conflicts between general laws and local ordinances.
3 1
Much of the case law in Louisiana dealing with this issue predates the
constitution of 1974, but the rationale employed in such cases could have
been applied in the instant case. It is settled law in Louisiana that a
municipality may regulate gambling as an incident of its police power.
32
Municipalities may never, however, prohibit activities expressly author-
ized by the legislature,33 nor may municipalities act at all in an area
which the legislature has expressly pre-empted. 34 Since Criminal Code
article 90 neither expressly authorizes non-commercial gambling nor ex-
pressly pre-empts all regulation of gambling, the issue in the instant case,
29. LA. R.S. 33:485 1.1 (Supp. 1952): "All municipalities in the state of Lousiana hav-
ing a population of one hundred thousand inhabitants or less are hereby authorized and
empowered to pass laws prohibiting within said municipalities gambling or games of
chance for money or for value in any form whatsoever, and to define what shall constitute
gambling and to provide penalties for the violation of any laws passed under the power
hereby delegated."
30. Although the majority opinion does not discuss this point, Chief Justice Sanders in
his dissent points out that this is an effect of the instant decision. 353 So. 2d at 999. LA.
CON T. art. XIV, § 18 dictates that any prior law which is inconsistent with the provisions
of the 1974 constitution ceases to be effective upon the constitution's effective date; thus, in
the instant case, since LA. R.S. 33:4851.1 would frustrate the exclusive grant of article XII,
section 6, to the legislature to define gambling, it became ineffective upon the constitution's
effective date.
31. See Kean, supra note 14, at 70-71, for a discussion of when general law denies
powers to local units. The discussion assumes that where the general law is expressly
"considered supreme," it should be a policy determination whether a general law should be
understood to deny any conflicting enactment by a municipality. In the instant case, the
state gambling statute would have to be found implicitly to deny authority to municipali-
ties to enact conflicting ordinances. Considering the ultimate determination of the court in
the instant case, such an implicit denial would probably have been found.
* 32. Fernandez v. Alford, 203 La. 111, 13 So. 2d 483 (1943).
33. Ozone Import Co. v. Millet, 329 So. 2d 476 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1976).
34. City of New Orleans v. Walker, 327 So. 2d 386 (La. 1976).
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under the rationale of prior jurisprudence, would thus have been
whether article 90 impliedly prohibits conflicting municipal enactments.
The question whether an attempt by a municipality to prohibit non-
commercial gambling conflicts with article 90 was faced in City of Alex-
andria v. Lacombe,35 which dealt with an Alexandria ordinance prohib-
iting non-commercial activity. The Louisiana Supreme Court held the
ordinance to be invalid, stating that "it can hardly be said that there is no
conflict" between the ordinance, which prohibited non-commercial gam-
bling, and article 90, which does not.36 The court stated that the two
provisions could not possibly be reconciled. 37 However, in the same
year in City of New Orleans v. Stone,38 the court upheld a New Orleans
ordinance that prohibited non-commercial lotteries on the basis of the
city's "sweeping police power" grant in its home rule charter. 39 Al-
though these two cases are factually distinguishable because Alexandria
is a "Lawrason Act" city while New Orleans is a home rule city with a
correspondingly different grant of authority, the rationales of the two
cases are contradictory. Regardless of the source of a city's grant of
power, under article XIV, section 40(d) of the constitution of 1921,41 no
municipality had the power to pass any ordinance inconsistent with any
general law. To the extent that the New Orleans ordinance was in con-
ffict with the state gambling statute, as it certainly was under the ration-
ale of Lacombe, it should have been held invalid, regardless of how
"sweeping" the grant of police power to New Orleans was under its char-
ter. The Lacombe language which recognized the conffict between article
90 and the Alexandria ordinance would appear to be the better view of
the law in this area, and would apply to the Shreveport ordinance. 42
35. 220 La. 618, 57 So. 2d 206 (1952).
36. Id. at 629, 57 So. 2d at 209.
37. Id. 57 So. 2d at 210.
38. 221 La. 133, 58 So. 2d 736 (1952).
39. Id. at 140, 58 So. 2d at 738-39.
40. 1898 La. Acts, No. 136. Many of the provisions of the Act are retained in some-
what different form in certain sections of title 33 of the Louisiana Revised Statutes. The
Act was a general legislative charter for any municipality incorporated after July 29, 1898,
setting up the municipality's form of government and defining its powers and functions.
See Peterman, Comments on the Laws of Louisiana Affecting Municipalities. Foreword to
19 LA. REV. STAT. ANN. (WEST) AT XXIX, XXIX-XXX (1950).
41. See note 9, supra, for the text of this section.
42. LA. R.S. 33:4851.1 (Supp. 1952) (see text in note 29, supra), was enacted by the
legislature in response to the Lacombe case. For municipalities with a population of
100,000 or less, an ordinance like the one in the Lacombe case could no longer be said to be
"in conflict" with general law inasmuch as a general law, section 4851.1, specifically au-
thorized such an ordinance. However, this would not be the case for municipalities with a
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Under the Lacombe rationale, the court in the instant case could
have found the Shreveport ordinance to be in conflict with article 90 and
thus invalid, since the general gambling law could be considered to deny
implicitly the power to municipalities to enact ordinances in conflict with
it.43 Although under this analysis the Shreveport ordinance would be
invalid, similar ordinances enacted by cities with a population of one
hundred thousand or less would be valid, since the legislature's express
authorization of such ordinances defeats any inference of pre-emption.
Thus, the foregoing analysis would have failed to further the majority's
policy determination that no municipality can define gambling differ-
ently from the legislature,44 but it would have been of considerable value
in clarifying Louisiana's theory of when municipal powers are denied by
general law because of conflict therewith. 45
In considering public policy it appears that the majority's rationale
was the proper analysis, especially in light of the apparent intentions of
the delegates to the Constitutional Convention of 1973 as reflected in
their debates dealing with municipal powers generally4 6 and article XII,
population of over 100,000, ie. Shreveport, Baton Rouge, and New Orleans, since they are
excluded from the grant of section 4851.1. Thus, the rationale of Lacombe should still be
applicable to Shreveport and Baton Rouge. Despite the fact that the Stone rationale ap-
pears erroneous, New Orleans had power to enact inconsistent ordinances under Stone's
authority prior to the constitution of 1974.
43. See also LA. CONST. art. VI, § 6(E), which allows new home rule units adopted
under that section to exercise certain powers "not denied by general law."
44. However, it is certainly arguable that, even if LA. R.S. 33:4851.1 had not been
effectively invalidated by the rationale in the instant case, it was unconstitutional anyway
under LA. CONST. art. VI, § 3, which provides that the legislature may classify municipali-
ties "according to population or on any other reasonable basis related to the purpose of the
classification." It is difficult to see any reasonable purpose for distinguishing between mu-
nicipalities of more than 100,000 population and those with a population of 100,000 or less,
for the purposes of granting power to define gambling. In any case, LA. CONST. art. XIV,
§ 18 provides that any laws enacted prior to the 1974 constitution which are in conflict
therewith became ineffective upon the effective date of the constitution. See note 30,
supra.
45. See J. FORDHAM, supra note 7, at 87-94, for a brief discussion of some other states'
dealings with the conflict issue. For a specific example of another state's treatment of the
conflict issue as relates to gambling ordinances and statutes, see Birmingham v. Richard,
203 So. 2d 692 (Ala. App. 1967), wherein the court pronounced a Birmingham ordinance,
which prohibited gambling in private, invalid as being inconsistent with the state statute
that prohibited only public gambling. See also Kean, supra note 14, at 71, where the
author notes that, under the 1974 constitution, new decisions may be necessary to deter-
mine when general laws deny local government power.
46. See generally STATE OF LOUISIANA CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF 1973 VER-
BATIM TRANSCRIPTS Sept. 19, 1973 at 71-77, 79-92; id. Sept. 20, 1973 at 3-78; id. Sept. 21,
1978] 1115
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section 6 in particular. 47 In regard to municipal powers, as set out in
article VI, sections 4, 5(E), and 7(A), it is true, as the majority noted, that
the new constitution confers much broader residual powers upon munic-
ipal units than they had previously enjoyed. However, the action of the
delegates in deleting from the committee proposal a section which would
have required these powers to be "construed liberally in favor" of such
municipal units48 evinces their intent to strike a balance between in-
creased powers of municipalities, on the one hand, and state policymak-
ing through general laws on the other.49 Concerning article XII, section
6, it is clear from the debates that the delegates' concern was with "com-
mercial" or "organized" gambling, as opposed to "social" gambling like
private card games. In fact, several delegates seemed apprehensive that
the provision might cover social gambling and sought assurances from
proponents of various amendments that such was not the casei
0
1973 at 11-75; id. Sept. 22, 1973 at 2-45; id. Sept. 25, 1973 at 2-59; id. Sept. 26, 1973 at 1-20
[hereinafter cited as PROCEEDINGS].
47. See generally PROCEEDINGS, supra note 46, Jan. 8, 1974 at 115-27; id. Jan. 9, 1974
at 2-31.
48. OFFICIAL JOURNAL OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION
OF 1973 OF THE STATE OF LOUSIANA Sept. 25, 1973 at 4 [hereinafter cited as JOURNAL].
The entire section would have read, "Powers and functions of local governmental subdivi-
sions shall be construed liberally in favor of such local governmental subdivisions."
49. As evidence of the convention's intent to limit the otherwise broad powers granted
to municipal units, the convention repeatedly adopted amendments to certain sections of
article VI which subjected those sections to consistency with the constitution. See JOUR-
NAL, supra note 48, Sept. 21, 1973 at 4-6; id. Sept. 22, 1973 at 2; id. Sept. 25, 1973 at 2. Of
course, any power exercised by a municipality is subject to the provisions of the constitu-
tion. The fact that the convention saw fit to include this language expressly is evidence of
its intent to avoid any question about this fact.
50. PROCEEDINGS, supra note 46, Jan. 8, 1974, at 115-27. The next day, Delegate
Gravel stated his belief that there was no effort on the part of any of the delegates to put
language in the provision that, fairly interpreted, "would prevent ... forms of gambling
• . . that people engage in on a private basis." Id., Jan. 9, 1974, at 24. In his dissent,
Chief Justice Sanders quoted some of Delegate Gravel's language from the same day
which, taken out of context, appeared to support the position that the convention did not
wish to change a municipality's "right" to define gambling in a manner differently from the
state gambling statute. 353 So. 2d at 999. However, a reading of the entire discussion
makes it clear that the delegates were not concerned with municipal powers at that point:
the discussion at that point centered around the question whether the provision as it read at
that time, directing the legislature to define "commercial gambling," would allow the legis-
lature to prohibit private gambling at some future date if it so desired. Mr. Gravel's re-
sponse indicated that the legislature could prohibit private gambling if it desired, much as
it could under the 1921 constitution and as some municipalities could under LA. R.S.
33:4851.1. PROCEEDINGS, supra note 46, Jan. 9, 1974 at 26-27.
Thus, the supreme court in the instant case has correctly limited
municipal powers to the extent necessary to protect the state's policy of
punishing as "gambling" only such conduct as constitutes commercial
gambling. This is a sound policy because it may be unfair to punish a
citizen for engaging in conduct which the legislature has seen fit not to
prohibit. Furthermore, the result does not greatly impinge upon local
governmental police power since municipalities may still enact gambling
ordinances which are consistent with Criminal Code article 90. The de-
cision in the instant case therefore promotes state policy without greatly
burdening municipal powers, a "balanced" result which certainly ap-
pears consistent with the new philosophy of municipal powers under ar-
ticle VI of the 1974 constitution.
James Joseph Sullivan
BRINGING ORDER TO A DISORDERLY PLACE
Defendant was indicted for keeping a disorderly place I when police
investigation indicated that his two lounges in Bossier City were habitu-
ally used for an "immoral sexual purpose." The investigation stemmed
from allegations that the normal course of events in these lounges in-
cluded "B-drinking and lewd dancing."' 2 The Louisiana Supreme Court
held Criminal Code article 104, forbidding the "intentional maintaining
of a place to be habitually used. . . for any immoral sexual purpose,"
3
to be unconstitutionally vague. State v. Defrances, 351 So. 2d 133 (La.
1977).
The United States Supreme Court has interpreted the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment as guaranteeing individuals the
right "to be informed as to what the State commands or forbids."'4 Due
process requires that statutory language be sufficiently definite to give a
person of ordinary intelligence "fair warning" of what is prohibited, "so
1. LA. R.S. 14:104 (1950) provides in part: "Keeping a disorderly place is the inten-
tional maintaining of a place to be used habitually for any illegal purpose or for any im-
moral sexual purpose."
2. State v. Defrances, 351 So. 2d 133, 134 (La. 1977).
3. LA. R.S. 14:104 (1950); See note 1, supra, for the text of this section.
4. Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451, 453 (1939).
5. United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 617 (1953); American Communications
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